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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing Mr. McKay's Application for
Post-Conviction Relief Because the Jury Instructions Failed to Instruct Regarding
the Element of Cause and That Element Was at Issue in Mr. McKay's Trial.
1.

"In such unlawful manner."

In instructing the jury regarding the elements of vehicular manslaughter, the district court
deviated from ICJI 709, misstated the law and misled the jury by omitting the phrase "in such
unlawful manner." At a jury instruction conference on October 29, 2004, the district court
inquired whether trial counsel had any "objections or concerns regarding the instructions." R.
(34271), pg. 110. In response, trial counsel indicated "we have talked briefly about cause, and
the dilemma is what to do about cause. And I have essentially taken the position that cause is
something that I'm not requesting a jury [instruction] on this morning, but it's certainly part of
the dilemma." R. (34271), pg. 110. In failing to object to erroneous jury instructions, trial
counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable manner.
The state nevertheless contends that trial counsel did not perform deficiently because he
requested a jury instruction that included the language "in such unlawful manner" on October 22,
2004, and, in so doing, implicitly objected to the district court's later proposed instruction
omitting that language. However, in filing proposed jury instructions, trial counsel "respectfully
request[ed] this Court to consider said instructions in instructing the jury in this action." R. 83.

In this pleading, trial counsel did not indicate that he objected to jury instructions which deviated
from the proposed instructions. Additionally, trial counsel expressly declined to raise an
objection to the district court's proposed instructions. Thus, the record shows that trial counsel
did not object to the erroneous instructions because be failed to "state distinctly the instruction

to which [he] objects and the grounds of the objection" as required by I.C.R. 30(b).
Mr. McKay's position on the matter is essentially conceded by the state in its argument
that appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the jury instruction issue as he was
precluded from doing so under the invited error doctrine. Respondent's Brief, pg. 16
("[Alppellate counsel was precluded from raising such an argument for the first time on appeal
given that McKay's proposed elements instruction also used the word 'caused' rather than
significant cause."). Thus, deficient performance has been established because trial counsel not
only failed to object but actually invited the giving of the erroneous instruction.
To the extent this Court concludes that trial counsel did object to the district court's
instruction and that objection was overruled, then appellate counsel was deficient for failing to
raise the preserved objection as an issue on direct appeal. The state claims the jury was "clearly
advised" that in order to be guilty, Mr. McKay's operation of a motor vehicle while DUI must
have caused Mr. Cox's death. Respondent's Brief, p. 17. To the contrary, the jury was
instructed that Mr. McKay was guilty if he committed a DUI and his "operation of the motor
vehicle caused the death of [Mr. Cox]." R. 153. Unlike ICJI 709, the district court's instruction
failed to require the jury to link Mr. McKay's DUI with Mr. Cox's death. For instance, that Mr.
Cox was invisible to Mr. McKay does not change the fact that his operation of a motor vehicle
caused Mr. Cox's death. However, if Mr. Cox was invisible to Mr. McKay, the fact that Mr.
McKay might have been under the influence of alcohol was not a significant cause of Mr. Cox's
death because, regardless of Mr. McKay's level of intoxication, he could not have avoided hitting
what he could not see. Thus, his operation of the vehicle "in such unlawful manner" was not a
significant cause of the accident.

The phrase "in such unlawful manner," which is found in the pattern instructions and
absent from the district court's instruction, clarifies that a defendant is not guilty of vehicular
manslaughter unless his culpable conduct caused a death. Because the omission of the phrase "in
such unlawful manner" prejudiced Mr. McKay, the district court erred in summarily dismissing
his application for post-cofiviction relief.
2.

"Significant cause contributing to the death."

The district court erred in replacing the phrase "significant cause contributing to the
death," which is found in ICJI 709 and I.C. $ 18-4006(3), with the phrase "caused the death."
Echoing the district court, the state urges that this deviation from the pattern instruction and
statute raised the state's burden of proof and, thus, benefitted Mr. McKay. However, as
acknowledged by the state, the legislature amended LC. 9 18-4006(3) by replacing the word
"causes" with "significant cause" because the previous language was confusing and subject to
inconsistent interpretations. Nonetheless, relying on the legislature's intent to broaden the

standard of proof in vehicular homicide cases, the state asserts that the only reasonable
interpretation of the word "causes" is to be the sole cause. However, that the legislature was
motivated to amend the statutory language to prevent interpretations that raised the state's burden
of proof fails to support the conclusion that the "sole cause" interpretation is the only reasonable
one. Although interpreting "caused" as "a cause" lowers the state's burden of proof, it is
doubtful any legislator that desired re-election would indicate a statute was being amended in
order to make a crime more difficult to prove.
The legislature amended LC. $ 18-4006(3) to read "significant cause" instead of "causes"
in response to "confusion" and "inconsistent interpretations" by judges and juries. 1997 Idaho

Session Laws Ch. 103, § 1. By instructing the jury that Mr. McKay was guilty if his operation of
a motor vehicle "caused" Mr. Cox's death, the district court failed to clarify whether the
operation of the vehicle must have been the only cause, a significant cause or a minor cause. For
instance, the jury could have concluded that the absence of a taillight was the primary cause of
the accident but that Mr. McKay's intoxication was also a contributing factor - or, in other
words, that the absence of a taillight and Mr. McKay's intoxication "caused" the accident. Under
the jury instructions given, the jury should have found Mr. McKay guilty even if it concluded that
the absence of the taillight was the significant cause of the accident but that Mr. McKay's
impaired driving "may have in some way contributed to a motor vehicle accident which resulted
in death." See Idaho Session Laws Ch. 103, § 1, Statement of Purpose.
This sort of logic is not without precedent. For example, some people believe that the act
of a guard helping a passenger onto a train was the cause of the injuries to Helen Palsgraff
because if set into motion a chain of events, i.e. the dislodging of a package of fireworks, which
resulted in the package falling upon the rails, which resulted in the fireworks exploding, the
shock of which resulted in the throwing down of some scales at the other end of the platform
many feet away which struck and injured Mrs. Palsgraf. Likewise here, some jurors might have
concluded that had Mr. McKay not been driving at all the accident would not have occurred and
thus his driving was the cause. And, in that sense, he was the cause of the accident, although not
a significant cause because other intervening causes were more significant. The point is that
jurors can be easily confused on this issue because the concept of what constitutes cause is
elusive.
What is a cause in a legal sense, still more what is a proximate cause, depend in

each case upon many considerations, as does the existence of negligence itself.
Any philosophical doctrine of causation does not help us. A boy throws a stone
into a pond. The ripples spread. The water level rises. The history of that pond is
altered to all eternity. It will be altered by other causes also. Yet it will be forever
the resultant of all causes combined. Each one will have an influence. How great
only omniscience can say. You may speak of a chain, or, if you please, a net. An
analogy is of little aid. Each cause brings about future events. Without each the
future would not be the same. Each is proximate in the sense it is essential. But
that is not what we mean by the word. Nor on the other hand do we mean sole
cause. There is no such thing.

Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J. dissenting).
The jury instructions here permitted the jury to find Mr. McKay guilty even if the state
had not met its burden to prove that Mr. McKay's culpable conduct was the proximate cause of
Mr. Cox's death. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that replacing the phrase
"significant cause contributing to the death" with the word "caused" raised the state's burden of
proof, and in suinmarily dismissing Mr. McKay's application for post-conviction relief.
3.

Prejudice.

Because the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a finding in Mr.
McKay's favor with respect to the element of cause, the error in the jury instructions is
reversible. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999); State v. Thompson, 143 Idaho 155,
158, 139 P.3d 757, 760 (Ct. App. 2006). In arguing to the contrary, the state points out that there
was evidence to contradict the defense theory that Mr. Cox's motorcycle did not have a taillight.
However, the question is not whether there was sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict
but, rather, whether there was evidence that could have rationally led the jury to accept the
defense theory with regard to the element on which the jury was misinstructed.
Here, no sign of Mr. Cox's taillight, housing or assembly was found at the scene of the

accident nor on Mr. McKay's vehicle, despite thorough searches. Tr. (31652) pg. 407, in. 15 to
pg. 408, In. 22.; pg. 705. p. 8-14. The evidence also established that Mr. McKay did not see Mr.
Cox's motorcycle prior to impact and that Mr. Cox "barely idl[ed] over the tracks." Tr. (31652)
pg. 217, In. 23-24; pg. 484, in. 22-23; pg. 486, in. 11-13; pg. 634, in. 17-18; see also Tr. (31652)
pg. 181, in. 16-20; pg. 217, in. 15-17; pg. 240, in. 17-21. If Mr. Cox's unlit motorcycle was
almost at standstill in the dark, Mr. McKay would have been unable to prevent the accident
regardless of his level of intoxication. Thus, there was evidence presented at trial that could have
rationally led the jury to conclude that Mr. McKay's commission of a DUI was not the significant
cause of the accident resulting in Mr. Cox's death.
The state also argues that the jury's acceptance of the theory that Mr .Cox's taillight was
not working "does not mean the jury would have concluded [Mr.] McKay's unlawful act of
driving under influence was not a 'significant cause contributing' to [Mr. Cox's] death."
Respondent's Brief, p. 18. Of course, a properly instructed jury might have rejected Mr.
McKay's evidence and found him guilty. Nonetheless, because the jury instructions misstated
the law, the jury was deprived of the opportunity to acquit Mr. McKay if it accepted his theory of
the evidence. Accordingly, Mr. McKay was prejudiced by trial and appellate counsels' failures
to raise the errors in the jury instruction at trial and on direct appeal.
111. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief, Mr. McKay asks this Court to
remand his application for post-conviction relief to the district court with instruction to grant Mr.
McKay his requested relief, or in the alternative, to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
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